Sinyee

ASEAN- The East Timor Crisis

The most difficult challenge to ASEAN’s modalities was the tragic events in East Timor in 1999. ASEAN, and even the ARF, came under severe criticisms for their inability to stem the violence and gross violations of human rights that followed. As noted in many accounts, ASEAN could not initiate any form of conflict preventive action to stop the atrocities that occurred in many parts of the country soon after the East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia (Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc., 2002, para.22). It was not until the United Nations organized a peacekeeping mission under the framework of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) that violence was controlled and large-scale humanitarian relief operations could be carried out (Martin, 2001).

Violence started to erupt through large parts in East Timor after Indonesia’s decision on 30 August 1999 to allow the province to have a referendum on its future status – either to become an autonomous province or independent state (Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1999, p. 4). During this period, the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established to help prepare East Timor for the referendum. UNAMET comprised 241 international staff, 420 UN volunteers, up to 280 civilian police, and some 4,000 local staff. Within ASEAN, the Philippines contributed to UNAMET by sending civilian police, staff members, and electoral volunteers (Martin, 2001).

In spite the presence of UNAMET, violence escalated and spread throughout East Timor leading to the declaration of martial law on 7 September (Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1999). By then, East Timor lost human lives, suffered massive property destruction, while thousands of terrified people were also forcibly displaced to West Timor.

Many governments, either individually or collectively through the UN, urged Indonesia to enforce law and order in East Timor. While there were indeed expressions of concerns coming from ASEAN countries, it took the Australian initiative to offer its troops for a UN peacekeeping force before any international action could begin to stop the violence in East Timor (Dupont, 2000, p. 163 - 170). Even then, it was not until Indonesia consented to an international peacekeeping force in East Timor that ASEAN officials began to discuss their countries’ possible participation in the UN peacekeeping force. Incidentally, discussions took place at the sidelines of APEC Summit in Auckland and prior to that, no ad hoc ASEAN meeting was convened to address what was at that time a spiralling humanitarian crisis in the region (Dupont, 2000,).

The East Timor crisis was viewed by many as a humanitarian disaster waiting to happen and which ASEAN, conscious of its policy of non-intervention, did not do anything to prevent. Although some ASEAN members participated in the INTERFET, its contributions were lost in the barrage of criticisms against the extent to which ASEAN went to “intervene” in what was considered by the organization as an intra-state conflict (Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 1999). Criticisms were even more strident of the ARF which was silent throughout the crisis. Once again, ASEAN inability to respond to the crisis in East Timor was seen as a litmus test of its inadequacy as a regional institution to act in time of crisis or to prevent crisis from happening.
Recommendations

ASEAN’s lack of capacity to address domestic and regional conflicts was highlighted as a major weakness. In East Timor, ASEAN fell short of what was expected from it, especially during the initial stage of the conflict. It could consider working in any of the following areas:

1. exchange of ideas, information, and other resources with relevant actors/parties,
2. consideration and adoption of early warning tools and mechanisms,
3. establishment of regional mechanisms for peace-building, and
4. institutionalization of regular consultations among ASEAN, the ARF Chair, and the UN Secretary-General.

I proposed that one of the ways to assess its role, as a conflict manager in Southeast Asia, ASEAN has to examine the nature of its mechanisms in managing conflict. Bearing in mind that the mechanisms in this context refers to a broad range of processes, methods, devices, techniques, and strategies employed to resolve or manage conflict, it is important for ASEAN to adopt the constructivist approach on identifying what these mechanisms are in the context of Southeast Asia. Constructivism proved to be a useful framework in explaining the lack or absence of concrete, formal mechanisms in ASEAN since the approach goes beyond the consideration of power and material interest and sensitizes us to the salience of ideational factors, to actors and agents that shape these ideas beyond the state and the intersubjective understanding that take place.

For the association to succeed and in the interest of regional security, its mechanisms must be geared towards engendering a sense community through shared norms and identity – regardless of incremental nature of its results. Even at that time, the importance of process-oriented approaches to regional security was underscored.

The ASEAN way could be extended and transformed into a wider regional process of promoting co-operative security practices, albeit at its most basic, to main regional stability. ASEAN also needs to muster the political will in order to play a larger role in regional peace-building activities. It should be more active in on-going peace-building activities, such as the present negotiations on a Regional Code of Conduct on the South China Sea between ASEAN and China, as well as its role in Cambodia, East Timor, and Myanmar.


References

Dupont. A. (2000), ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis: Australian Journal of International Affairs, Routledge, Australia.

Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. (1999), The East Timor Crisis and Its Consequences. Retrieved 27 May, 2010 from http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1344/MR1344.ch3.pdf

Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. (2002), Narrative Report on the Seminar on Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Southeast Asia: Regional Mechanisms, Best Practices and ASEAN-UN Cooperation in the 21st Century. Retrieved 27 May, 2010 from http://www.aseansec.org/un_manila.htm

Martin, I. (2001), Self-Determination in East Timor, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.: Boulder, CO.

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